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refrained from ratifYing or signing specific
treaties on outer space. Secondly, states are
invited to express their views on ways to
further the adherence to these space treaties.

THE 1972 LIABILITY CONVENTION
Enhancing Adherence and Effective
Application
1. Introduction

The treaties between themselves have
established within a relatively speaking short
tune frame a legal framework for activities in
space which is workable as well as rather
comprehensive and coherent. Therefore, the
effort to enhance the adherence to' and
application of space law by means of the
present proposal is to be applauded very
much. At the same time, the aims which the
proposal tries to achieve should for that
reason be interpreted as broadly and
generously as possible. This certainly applies
to the Liability Convention of 1972 2

The present Meeting of the Legal
Subcommittee ofUNCOPUOS has adopted
a new item on the agenda: the "Review of
the status of the five international treaties
governing outer space", as proposed by the
Government of the Republic of Mexico. 1
This item may well constitute a valuable
contribution to the codification and further
development of the international law
pertinent to space activities.
The document proposes two major steps to
be taken in order to achieve the widest and
fullest adherence to the treaties concerned.
Firstly, information should be collected with
each state as to why it has, in pertinent cases,

2Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects (hereafter
Liability
Convention).
London/MoscowlWashingtol1. adopted 29 November
197 L opened for signature 29 March 1972. entered
into force 1 September 1972: 10 ILM 965 (1971): 24
UST 2389: TIAS 7762: 961 UNTS 187.

I See
further
document
AIAC.105/C21L.206/Rev.1, of 4 April 1997
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Liability Convention, while on the contrary
having ratified or signed the Outer Space
Treaty, are not allowed to simply ignore its
legal contents. Such states would have to
prove in any given case that the former
Convention would not constitute an
elaboration with customary legal force of the
latter Treaty.7

2. The Liabilitr Convention the status quo
and current developments
Taking stocks of the present measure of
adherence to the Liability Convention,
according to the most recent information3,
currently there are 76 states which have
ratified the Convention. 4 A further 25 states
have signed the Convention. So, slightly over
half of the world's states are presently bound
at least to respects of the Liability
Convention. That is not a bad score,
especially if one keeps in mind that amongst
them more or less all the space-faring
countries nations are to be found. 5

The other problem is more specifically of a
legal character. The privatization of space
and space activities challenges the essence of
international space law, as currently given
shape mainly through the five treaties at
issue. The historically detennined and almost
complete orientation of the col]J1Is juris
spatialis internationalis on states and state
actors is put in the balance.

Moreover,
the Liability Convention
essentially is an elaboration of article VII of
the Outer Space Treaty. 6 This means, that
even states neither party nor signatory to the

The Liability Convention warrants special
attention from this dual perspective. As to
space debris, legally speaking the proqlem is
usually phrased in terms of liability for the
damage caused by such debris. Regarding
privatization, the mode of operation of the
rules on liability in the case of private space
ventures is of paramount importance for the
safety of commercial operations in outer
space.

3See AlAC.105/C.21L.206/Rev.1 of 4 April
1997, at 1.

4Signature without further ratification is
generally conceived under international law to imply
for the state in question at least the duty not to defeat
object and purpose of such a treaty; in otller words:
not to clearly behave in contradiction with the
general spirit and main aims of the treaty at issue.
Cf. Art 18(a), Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, Vienna, done 23 May 1969, entered into
force 27 January 1980; 8 ILM 679 (1969). Thus,
some general obligations may be deduced even for
such state under that treaty.

3. The Liability Convention and space
debris

5 Amongst those states which did neither
sign nor ratify the convention, from this perspective
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Tonga and Turkey
may be deemed the most notable.

7The only directly important case of a state
missing amongst the parties to the Outer Space
Treaty. yet important from the perspective of the
Liability Convention because of the B~konur launch
base, concerns Kazakhstan. Amongst those further
absent from the list of parties and signatories the
most noteworthy examples in terms of interest in.
and capacity for space activities are such states as
Costa Rica, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of
Korea and Portugal, as well as a number of other
former constituent pans of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia.

6Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Expiration and Use of
Outer Space. including the Moon und Other Celestial
Bodies (hereafter Outer Space Treaty), LondonMoscow-Washington, adopted 19 December 1966,
opened for signature 27 January 1967, entered into
force 10 October 1967; 6 ILM 386 (1967); 18 UST
2410; TIAS 6347; 610
UNIS 20S.
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and/or certain other provisions already
dealing with space· objects and their
component parts. Such an amendment
should essentially extend the present quasidefinition of "space object" as found in
Article I( d) of the Convention. A space
object· should be redefined as including,
where applicable, any part of it capable of
causing damage. Of course, the practical
problem of identification remains. Often, a
certain piece of space debris can not be
related to a specific space object. In such
cases effective operation of the Liability
Convention for the purpose of redeeming
damage would in any case be precluded.

By and large those states themselves capable
of causing space debris (however
inadvertently) are already bound by the
Liability Convention's provisions. Thus, the
major task to achieve in this respect would
be to enhance its effective application, rather
than adherence as such Further adherence, to
the extent considered essential' would
anyway also hinge upon the perceived
effectiveness of the Convention. Three maJor
problems would call for a solution to achieve
large steps forward on this issue.
3.1. The definition of5pace ol?ject.

The first problem relates to the definition of
"space object" or "component parts" thereof,
as it triggers the application of the
Convention's liability rules. The question
arises here to what extent space debris falls,
or could fall within that definition. At the
theoretical level, this problem has been
discussed extensively. Usually, the debate
turned around the (potential) functioning or
functionality perceived by many to be
inherent in the definition of "space object",
which would thus exclude 'useless' space
debris. 8

This problem as such lies outside the scope
of the Liability Convention itself - and would
be a matter either for the Registration
Convention 9,
or
for
non-legal
instrumentaliti es.
3.2. Unident?/iable ,\pace debris

In the abstract law could perhaps be
supportive to dealing with damage caused by
those pieces of debris which cannot be
retraced to a certain space object and
thereby to a certain space launching state.
Thus, the second major problem related to
the Liability Convention poses itself as: how
can the law enhance the solution of problems
caused by unidentifiable space debris and the
damage it causes? Two options might be
worthy of consideration and discussion in
this respect. Both would clearly require
formal additions to the Liability Convention,
most probably through additional protocols.

Here, two different solutions could be
envisaged. On the one hand, one could aim
for
an
authoritative
international
interpretation that would include space
debris as such in the definition of "space
object" or, preferably, of "component part".
This solution has the major advantage of
informality while nevertheless making the
Convention applicable in relevant cases.
In the alternative, a formal amendment
might be required, when the first solution
would be considered to run counter to logic

9Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched Into Outer Space (hereafter Registration
Convention), New, York, adopted 12 November
1974, opened for signahlfe 14 January 1975. entered
into force 15 September 1976: 14 ILM 43 (1975): n
UST 695: TJAS 8480: 1023 ENTS 15.

8See e.g. S. Gorove, Issues Pertaining to the
Legal
Definition
"Space
Object",
2
Telecommunications & Space Journal (1995), 135 fr.
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Firstly, there would be the preventive option
of establishing a worldwide monitoring
entity, tracking debris not only in a more
comprehensive fashion than is already the
case, but also making these data available to
all those potentially interested. It might well
be that too often lack of information on
certain launches, the discarding of satellites,
and accidents or incidents in outer space is at
the basis of the inability to track a certain
piece of space debris causing damage.

the form of a particular percentage of the
launch cost.
3.3. The definition of" damage"
The third major problem related to the
Liability Convention from the perspective of
space debris concerns the definition of
"damage". The general consensus is that the
term Itdamage'\ as defined by Article I(a) of
the Convention, is confined to physical
damage to property and, in the case of
humans themselves, mental damage. "II

As a matter of fact, some minds keen on the
problem have already gone one large step
further. Thus, the University of Arizona has
set up a project not so much to create a
global entity monitoring debris, and its
corning into existence, but aiming to actually
clean up outer space or at least some
junkyard and graveyard orbits. III It will be
obvious, however, that fmancialand other
obstacles would preclude creation of such a
space garbage collector for the near future.

The mere pollution of the space
environment, which is almost by definition
the result of the coming into being of space
debris, is not "damage" in such a sense that
it triggers application of the Convention. 11
may be hard to substantiate any damage later
on caused by the existence of such pollution
to scientific or commercial activities. Yet, a
way should probably be found to attach a
direct and substantial price tag to creating
such space debris, with the "fine" thus paid
going into the guarantee fund alluded before.
Obviously, this would be a solution for a
distinct protocol to achieve.
Another aspect of the issue of "damage" as
related to space debris may require a less
formal solution. Including in the operative
definition of damage. the indirect' damage
which commercial operations would offer
from particular pieces of space debris would
only need an authoritative interpretation, for
example by way of an UNCOPUOS-guided
Resolution. A similar solution could be
found in including the damage which
scientific activities suffer from space debris,
in terms of the high costs it would, take to

Secondly, the option to establish an
international guarantee fund has repeatedly
entered the discussion. Many states know of
such a construction nationally with regard to
road transport: damage caused by
unidentified and unidentifiable cars (read
their owners and drivers) to innocent victims
is compensated from such a fund Similarly,
an international guarantee fund might
compensate damage caused by unidentifiable
space debris. The fund should be financed at
least largely by the active space-faring
community. One could think in this respect
of an obligatory contribution to the
gu~rantee fund for every individual launch in

JOSee P. Stems & L. Tennen, The
Autonomous Space Processor for Orbital Debris
(ASPOD) Project and the Law of Outer Space:
Preliminary Jurisprudential ObsenJations. in

IlSee P.L. Meredith & G.S. Robinson .
Space Law: A Case Study for the Practitioner
(1992), 62-4; C.Q. Christol. The Modem
International Law of Outer Space (1982), 97-100: S.
Gorove, Developments in Space Law (]99]). 224 5.
242.

Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Colloquium on the
Law of Outer Space (1996), 107-20.
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achieve the intended results, in the notion of
damage as relevant under the Convention.

In this regard, the definition of 'procurement'
is generally agreed upon as 'causing the
launch to occur, which boils down in most
cases to paying for it. Furthermore the
(seemingly) clear definition of who is liable
under what kind of liability and for which
damage is further enhanced by provisions for
example detailing the rules for cases where
different states qualifY as liable states. 13

4. The Liability Convention and private
space· activities.
,

The present regime ofinternational space law
does not take private space activities into
account in any detailed manner. International
liability for space activities and their Juridical
consequences therefore exclusively rests with
the states. This holds good. apparently, also
In
cases where the activities under
consideration are partly or even exclusively
undertaken by private entities. In this case,
one major problem stands out when it comes
to effective adherence and application. It
even precedes any discussion on the
effectiveness of the dispute settlement system
incorporated in the Convention and its
application to cases of involvement of private
entities. The gradual privatization of space
activities necessitates a closer look at the
attribution ofliability as dealt with under the
Convention.

However, the operation of the Convention's
regime in cases of private involvement is far
from clear. What if no officials of a state or
state agency are involved in the conduct of
the relevant launch, but only employees of a
private launch provider? Does this qualifY
the state whose nationals such employees are
as the - liable state? Or does it, in the
alternative, make the state liable whose
nationality the private entity has - which
could very well be another state? Both such
interpretations on the basis of nationality
would invoke an equation of private
activities and state activities as provided by
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty in the
application of Article VII of the Outer Space
Treaty and the Liability Convention.

4.1. Liability at the international level

Or should, under this criterion, no state be
considered the liable one? Could the Liability
Convention then nevertheless, as if applying
by proxy, make the launching entity directly
and privately liable? Similar problems may
arise regarding private entities procuring
launches, or offering their facilities for
launch.

It is true that the Liability Convention does
provide for a clear, fourfold definition of the
entities liable in case a space activity causes
damage to another state or its entities. The
definition operates through a focus on the
launch of the space object which causes the
damage under consideration.
More
importantly, in each case it is a particular
state or number of states being made liable.
Thus, the Convention qualifies cumulatively
as liable states the state which launched the
relevant space object, the state which
procured that launch, the state whose facility
was used for that launch, and finally the state
whose territory was used for that launch. 12

Only on the issue of territory, no private
entity could juridically 'take the place' of a
state. At least one state could always be
pinpointed as the liable entity in case of
damage. But even the criterion of territory
will no longer serve as an absolute guarantee

l2See Art. I(c), Liability Convention.

J3 See
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Art. IV. V. Liability Convention

that someone would be obliged to
compensate damage in applicable cases. 14
The Sea Launch-project now well under
way, is about to conduct the first launches
from the high seas - outside any state's
territory in a legal sense! - soon. 15

The point is, however, that the framework
for such national legislation is not properly
defined on the international level. As a
consequence, such national legislation
threatens to preclude any unifonn
interpretation and application of the terms of
the Liability Convention. Gaps and overlaps
in terms of scope may appear, threatening
the consistency and uniformity of the
application of the international liability
regime as a whole, and thereby its effective
operation.

4.2. Liability at the national level
Some states have already solved this problem
on their own account and as far as relevant
for themselves. Faced with the consequences
of private space activities under this
international liability regime, they enacted
national laws specifically - dealing with space
and space activities of private enterprise16 .
These laws generally include provisions for
reimbursement by the private entity licensed
under the national law of any compensation
paid out by the states as a consequence of
international liability claims.

Moreover, in the absence of unequivocal and
authoritative international guidance, the
'practice' of national space legislation
effectively starts working the other way
round as well. It may constitute opinio juris
sive necesitatis of relevant states establishing
customary legal character of certain
interpretations. 17 Thus, a strong argument
can be made for looking at national
legislation for the purposes of determining
the legally correct interpretation of
international legal principles and notions.

14Cf. A. Kerrest de Rozavel, Launching
spacecraft from the sea and the Outer Space Treaty:
The Sea Launch Project, paper presented at the
Fortieth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space,
Turin, Oct. 1997 (to be published 1998), 6: "the
territory of launch is, at the moment, a "lock" in the
system. C... ) In the territory criterion is left aside
because of a launch from international domain, this
lock is being abandoned".

It is true, that in all cases obligations to
reimburse the state are applied to space
objects launched by private entities fi-om the
respective territory.
However, such
obligations are only rarely made applicable
as such to private entities who launch the
space object in question, procure such a
launch or lend their faCility for such a
launch, on the basis merely for example of
that private entity having the nationality of
that state.

15 See e.g. A. Kerrest de Rozavel, The
Launch of Spacecraft from the Sea, in Outlook on
Space Law over tlle Next 30 Years (Eds. G.
Lafferranderie· & D. Crowther)(1997), 217 ff.

Should one indeed read from this that it is
possible that under the criteria of launch
itself, procurement or facility no state might
be found which qualifies as a liable entity,
because it were private entities launching,

l'This concerns tlle United States, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, Russia and South Africa, and
(to a certain extent) France vis-a-vis Arianespace.
National (or in the case of France semi-international)
legal measures have been taken by tllose states, inter
alia providing for systems for licensing relevant
private entities and dealing amongst otllers with the
international liability of the licensing state for the
activities of such licences.

17See e.g. 1. Brounlie. Principles of Public
International Law (3rd ed.) (1979), 4-12.
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procuring and lending their facility for that
launch? Then we might be in trouble if,
indeed, the criterion of territory will turn out
no longer to be the guarantee of finding at
least one state liable.

under international space law would prevent
national
authorities
from
applying,
consciously or unconsciously, their own, far
from harmonized interpretations by means of
nationallaw. 20 Solving this problem should
be given high priority, before more and more
states will find themselves confronted with
the potential consequences of the ongoing
privatization of space. They will then
perceive a need to issue national regulation
vis-a-vis private enterprise without any
authoritative international guidance as to its
scope and contents. The result may be not
just gaps and overlaps, but 'flags of
convenience', 'license shopping' and a
growing disinterest in taking care ofliability
issues altogether.

Or should one continue to be dependent
upon discretionary unilateral action, such as
in the case of Sea Launch where the United
States obliged Boeing Commercial Space
Corporation to obtain a license under the
United States Commercial Space Launch
Act?18. While Boeing CSC may be the largest
shareholder in the Sea Launch consortium,
with its 40% share it is not the majority
shareholder. Moreover, Sea Launch itself is
registered in the Grand Cayman Islands and
thus, legally speaking, a consortium with the
nationality of the United Kingdom! 19

5. Conclusion

4.3. Linking international liability and
nationalliabilitv
.

The increase in private involvement in space

Essentially, two options are open to solve
these uncertainties. Firstly, a generally
accepted and very broad definition of liable
state would be accepted. It should include in
the term "state" those private entities with
the nationality of that state, for purposes of
launching, procuring launches and lending
facilities for launches. Secondly, an
amendment creating direct private liability

2°Cf. e.g. H.A. Wassenbergh. PuNic Law
Aspects (?i Private Space Activities and ,"imce
Tran,~portation in the Future, in Proceedings of the
Thirty-Eighth Colloquium on the Law of Outer
Space (1Y96), 247-8; H A Wassenbergh, A Launch
and a Space Transportation Lmv, separate .Ih)J1I
Outer Space Law?, 21 Air & Space Law, (1996),29-

31, for ideas on a private liability system for space
activities. Such public international law systems
dealing with private liability, can be found for
instance in the neighboring fieJd of air law. See e.g
Warsaw Convention for tIle Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, Warsaw, done 12 October 1929. entered into
force 13 Febmaty 1933: 137 LNTS J 1: dealing with
private liability for damage sllstained by passenger$
and cargo; and Rome Convention on Damage
Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the
Surface, Rome, done 7 October 1952, entered into
force 4 Febmary, 1958: 310 UNTS 181: providing
for private liability for damage sustained by third
parties on the ground. Cf. also P.N. Kooijmans.
,s'tate Succession and the 1929 If'arsa1l' Convention:
a Case StU{~V, in Air and Space Jaw: Dc Lege
Ferenda (Eds. T.L. Masson-Zwaan & P.M.J. Mendes
de Leon) (1992). 130, on the Warsaw Convention as
a "law-making treaty] the only aim of which is the
unification of private law".

ISUnder Sec. 6(a)(3)(A), Commercial Space
Launch Aa (Public Law 98-S7S, 98th Congress, H.R.
3942,30 October 1984; 98 Stat. 3055, amended by
Commercial Space Lmmch Act Amendments, Public
Law 100"-'1557. 100th Congress, H.R. 4399, 15
November 1988; 49 U.S.C. App. 261S; 102 Stat
3900). by being, in view of its 40% share controlled
by Boeing CSC, Sea Launch comes within the scope
of the definition of a United States corporate
national.
19See e.g. the Case Concerning the
Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company,
Limited (Second Phase) (Belgium v Spain). 5
Febmary 1970, I.Cl Rep. 1970,4, at 42.
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activities and the growing risks presented by
space debris are the two major problems
requiring priority treatment when it comes to
the Liability Convention In these areas,
particular and substantial success should and
could be achieved in the enhancement of
adherence to, and much more prominently,
effective application of the Liability
Convention.
Here, the essential choice is between formal
amendment (in whatever form) or informal
but
authoritative
harmonization
of
interpretations. In respect of the. Liability
Convention generally speaking the informal
approach seams to provide the best chance of
furthering the professed aim.
Perhaps, from the practical and political
point of view, the threats posed by largely
uncontrolled space debris and largely
uncontrolled privatization may not require a
large measure of priority attention. But it is
better to have a well-balanced elaboration of
the Liability Convention in place before third
party damage caused by space debris or by a
privately launched space object actually
occurs.
In the Netherlands there exists a saying - and
there will be little doubt that many more
countries know similar wisdom - that usually
one starts filling up the drinking pit only after
the calf has drowned. Metaphorically
speaking, it would be a real pity if we would
not start to fill up the pit now, at relatively
little cost, and thereby save a calf or two.
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